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Abstract
In this paper we examine the properties of a hybrid auction that com-
bines a sealed bid and an ascending auction. In this auction, each bidder
submits a sealed bid. Once the highest bid is known, the bidder who
submitted it is declared the winner if her bid is higher than the second
highest by more than a predetermined amount or percentage. If at least
one more bidder submitted a bid su¢ciently close to the highest bid (that
is, if the di¤erence between this bid and the highest bid is smaller than the
predetermined amount or percentage) the quali…ed buyers compete in an
open ascending auction that has the highest bid of the …rst stage as the
reserve price. Quali…ed bidders include not only the highest bidder in the
…rst stage but also those who bid close enough to her. We show that this
auction generates more revenue than a standard auction. Although this
hybrid auction does not generate as much revenue as the optimal auction,
it is ex-post e¢cient.JEL Classi…cation: C72, D44.
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1 Introduction
Hybrid auctions, which combine features of di¤erent auction formats, are becom-
ing increasingly popular as allocation mechanisms. Klemperer [1] for example
discusses the Anglo-Dutch auction - a hybrid of the sealed bid and ascending auc-
tions - that may perform better in terms of the traditional concerns of competition
policy such as preventing collusive, predatory and entry deterring behavior.
In this paper we examine the revenue properties of another hybrid auction,
one that combines a sealed bid …rst price auction with an ascending auction. This
particular mechanism has been used, for example, in the sale of the companies
constituted through the partial division of the Telebras System (The Brazilian
Telecom). The sale represented a major step towards the restructuring of the
telecommunications sector in the country and it raised in excess of US$ 20 billion.
This hybrid auction works as follows. Each buyer submits a sealed bid. Once
the highest bid is known, the bidder who submitted it is declared the winner
if her bid is higher than the second highest bid by more than a predetermined
amount or percentage. If at least one more bidder submitted a bid su¢ciently
close to the highest (that is, if the di¤erence between this bid and the highest
bid is smaller than the predetermined amount or percentage) the quali…ed buyers
compete in an open ascending auction that has the highest bid of the …rst stage
as the reserve price. Quali…ed bidders include the highest bidder in the sealed-bid
stage and those who bid su¢ciently close to her.
We develop a model that captures some of the features of this hybrid auction.
We model a situation where three risk neutral bidders compete in a two stage
auction. The …rst stage is a sealed bid …rst price auction. This is followed by
a Vickrey auction as a second stage when there are bids su¢ciently close to
the highest one in the …rst price sealed bid auction. We consider a model in
which potential buyers’ values have both a private and a common component.
Of course, special cases include the independent private values model and the
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pure common values case. For the case of a discrete distribution, we show that
the hybrid auction generates more revenue than any standard auction. In sections
3 and 4 we show that this result is robust to relaxing both the risk neutrality and
symmetry assumptions. The reason is that we may view this hybrid auction as
a Vickrey auction with a reserve price set endogenously at the …rst stage. As a
result, this mechanims is ex-post e¢cient.
2 The Basic Model
Suppose that three risk neutral bidders compete for a single object. Each bidder’s
valuation to the object is a function of a private value, speci…c to the agent, and
of an unknown common value. The individual’s private and common value
components are independently distributed. si; the vector of the signals observed
by the bidder has two elements: si = (si1; si2) ; where si1 is the private value, and
si2 is a signal sent by experts that represents an estimate of the common value
component of the object. The realized value of the object to bidder i, gross of her
expected payment, is given by
vi = ui (si; À) = si1 + À i = 1; 2; 3 (1)
where v is the common value component. The private value, si1; may take one
of two values,
si1 = fx0; x1g x0 < x1:
We suppose further that each player i; i = 1; 2; 3; knows her own private value,
but knows only that her opponents’ values are x1 with probability p or x0 with
probability q = (1¡ p) : This structure is common knowledge among players.
The common value, v, is not directly observable by the bidders. In this setting
À has one of two possible values. Without loss of generality, suppose that the
common value can be either V0 = 0 or V > 0: Let p0 be the probability that
the common value is V0 and pv the probability that it is V: Even though the
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bidder does not know the common value component, at the beginning of the
…rst period she has access to an expert’s appraisal of it. Therefore, she observes
simultaneously both her private value and the signal sent by the experts, si2. This
signal can also take two values, si2 = fL;Hg ; indicating an unfavorable result, L;
or a favorable result, H; from the experts estimates of the common value factor of
the object. Given this information structure, there is a positive probability that
the common value is mistakenly estimated. Let qLj0 be the probability that the
common value is 0 when the bidder receives a low signal and qHj0 the probability
that it has been mistakenly evaluated. In turn, let qHjV and qLjV be, respectively,
the probability that the bidder receives a favorable or an unfavorable result when
the item has a positive common value.
Given symmetry, we can restrict attention to the problem faced by one of the
bidders, say Bidder 1: Her goal is to choose a bid b (si1; si2) that maximizes her
expected payo¤. Let b(t) represent the tth highest bid. Conditional on winning
the auction, the expected pro…t of Bidder 1 who receives simultaneously signals
si1 and si2 and bids b is given by
Ej
h
(u (s11; v)¡ b (s11; s12)) 1fb(2)(sj1 ;sj2)+z<b(s11;s12)g js1; s2; s3
i
+ (2)
+Ej
h¡
u (s11; v) ¡ b(2) (sj1; sj2)
¢
1fb(2)(sj1;sj2)+z>b(s11;s12)g js1; s2; s3
i
:
An auction is said to be e¢cient if in equilibrium, for all signal values si =
(s1; s2; s3) ; the winner is buyer i such that vi (s1; s2; s3) ¸ vj (s1; s2; s3) ; 8j 6= i:
To aid our intuition, we start our analysis by considering the special case where
an individual’s value for the object is determined only by her private signal.
2.1 Independent Private Values
In the independent private values setting the agent’s value for the object is a
function of its private value only. The item has no intrinsic value that is common
to all bidders. In the general framework of the last section it amounts to set
À = V = V0 = 0 and vi (s1; s2;s3) = si1. Without loss of generality assume that
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the seller’s evaluation, vs; is equal to zero. Let s
(2)
jt be the second highest sjt
signal. Conditional on winning the auction, the expected return to the bidder 1
that observes signal si1 and bids b is given by
¼ (si1; b (si1)) = Ej
£
(si1 ¡ b (si1))1fb(si1)>b(sj1)+zg
¤
+ (3)
+Ej
·³
si1 ¡ s(2)j1
´
1n
s(2)j1 <b(si1)<b(sj1)+z
o¸ ;
where z is the cuto¤ value that implies the occurrence of the contingent second
stage. In this auction game the proper equilibrium notion is that of a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium. This concept extends the Nash equilibrium notion to static
games of incomplete information. Each player’s action is a best response to
other players’ actions, that is, each individual chooses a strategy that maximizes
her expected payo¤ given that the other players are also choosing strategies to
maximize their expected payo¤. A strategy for player i in a Bayesian game is
de…ned as a function from her set of types into her set of actions.1
We will focus on symmetric equilibrium, an equilibrium in which all bidders
choose the same bidding function. Given the discrete nature of the model, we
will characterize a mixed strategy equilibrium for this game consisting, for each
possible type of bidder, of a support to the strategies, that in the present setting
correspond to equilibrium bidding functions, and of the associated distribution
functions. Upon learning that her private value is x0, the lower type bidder never
bids higher than her value. By playing a mixed strategy that randomizes in a
variety of bids her expected pro…t would be negative. We will characterize an
equilibrium such that, for each player, a bidder observing x0 bids so as to earn
0 expected return and a bidder having a private value x1 randomizes according
to a continuous distribution function F (b) in
£
b; b
¤
: The equilibrium existence
is guaranteed by Maskin and Riley [3] who show that with a …nite number of
types and private values there is an equilibrium to the …rst price auction when
1See Myerson [7]:
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ties are solved through a Vickrey auction. To characterize the equilibrium it is
convenient to consider two separate cases.
2.1.1 x1 ¡ x0 > z
If a bidder has a value x0; she only wins the auction when all the other bidders
have the same value.
U (x0) =
1
3
(x0 ¡ b (x0)) (1¡ p)2
Her equilibrium bid must guarantee her a zero expected return, that is
b (x0) = x0:
Note that in this case the second stage Vickrey auction will always occur. How-
ever at this stage no bidder will raise her bid, otherwise she would pay more
than her value, earning a negative expected return. Ties in this stage will be
resolved through a random mechanism that assigns the same probability to all
participants.
If Bidder 1 has a private value x1, she wins the …rst price auction when
b1 (x1) ¡ bj (sj1) > z; 8j 6= 1: She may also win the auction in the second stage.
But if at least one of the other bidders has the same private value her expected
payo¤ from the Vickrey auction is zero once the equilibrium bidding function in
the second stage is to bid one’s value, that is, ¯¤ (si1) = si1; where ¯¤ (¢) stands
for the second stage equilibrium bidding function. Therefore, the expected return
of a bidder who bids b when she has value x1 for the item is
U1 (x1; b) = (x1 ¡ b)
£
(1 ¡ p)2 + 2p (1 ¡ p)F (b¡ z) + p2F 2 (b¡ z)¤ (4)
As there can be no gaps in the support of the equilibrium bids distribution, it is
possible to show that b = b (x0) = x0: In a mixed strategy equilibrium, the player
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must be indi¤erent to all bids in the support of her bids distribution. Given that
F (x0) = 0; one can …nd the expected return of a x1-type bidder who bids b.
U 1 = U1 (x1) = (x1 ¡ x0 ¡ z) (1¡ p)2 (5)
Using the fact that F
¡
b
¢
= 1 in (4) we are able to solve for b.
b =
¡
1 ¡ (1¡ p)2¢ (x1 ¡ z) + (1¡ p)2 x0
The equilibrium bid strategies for the …rst price auction with a Vickrey auction
as second stage when there are bids that are su¢ciently close to the higher bid
are:
b (si1) =
8><>>:
¢ x0 if si1 = x0;
¢ bid randomly in the interval £x0; b¤
according to the bid distribution function
F (b) if si1 = x1:
Proposition 1 The sealed bid …rst price auction with a Vickrey auction as the
second stage when there are bids that are su…ciently close to the highest bid implies
higher expected revenue to the seller relatively to standard auction institutions.
Proof. The seller’s expected revenue, ER; is the di¤erence between the
expected social surplus,
x0 (1¡ p)3 + x1 ¡1¡ (1¡ p)3¢ (6)
and the bidders expected return,
(1¡ p)Ul + pUh = 0 + p (x1 ¡ x0 ¡ z) (1¡ p)2
ER = x0 (1¡ p)3 + x1 ¡1¡ (1¡ p)3¢ ¡ 3p (x1 ¡ x0 ¡ z) (1¡ p)2
The e¤ect of z is to reduce the expected return to the high type bidder and,
therefore, to increase the seller’s expected revenue. The reason is that the hybrid
auction may be viewed as a Vickrey auction with an endogenously determined
7
reserve price. This generates more revenue than any standard auction with a
reserve price set at zero (that is, equal to the seller’s value).
Recall from the optimal auction literature (e.g., Myerson [6] and Riley and
Samuelson [9]) that the auction that maximizes the seller’s expected revenue may
be implemented by a Vickrey auction with an optimally chosen reserve price. This
of course implies that the optimal auction is ex-post ine¢cient – that is, there
is a positive probability that the object is not sold although there is at least
one bidder with a value greater than the seller’s value. In contrast, the hybrid
auction is ex-post e¢cient as the outcome of the …rst stage has produced at least
one bidder who is willing to pay the highest bid in that stage.
2.1.2 x1 ¡ x0 < z
We claim that when x1 ¡ x0 < z ,
b (vi) = x0 8i;8vi
is an equilibrium of the proposed auction mechanism. Furthermore, it implies
the same expected return to the seller as standard auction institutions.
When x1 ¡ x0 < z the second stage always occur and the hybrid mechanism
is equivalent to a Vickrey auction. The bidder equilibrium bidding function in
the second stage is ¯¤ (si1) : The bidder’s expected return is given by
U (x1) = (x1 ¡ x0) (1¡ p)2
and the seller’s expected revenue is then
R = x0 (1¡ p)3 + x1¡1¡ (1¡ p)3¢ ¡ 3 (x1 ¡ x0) p (1¡ p)2
In sum, the revenue equivalence theorem still holds in this setting.2
2>From now on we do not analyze the equilibrium when bidders’ valuations di¤er by a
magnitude smaller than z because in this case the hybrid auction is equivalent to a Vickrey
auction. This situation is analyzed in Maskin and Riley [2] and in Milgrom and Weber [5].
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3 Risk Aversion
In this section we drop the risk neutrality assumption retaining the assumption
that the item has no intrinsic value that is common to all bidders. In particular,
we extend the hybrid auction model to the case in which a buyer i who values the
commodity at vi and purchases a single item at a price ½ receives a Von Neumann
utility u (vi ¡ ½), where u (¢) is a strictly concave utility function normalized to
satisfy u (0) = 0: Conditional on winning the auction, the expected payo¤ of
Bidder 1 who observes a private value vi and bids b in the …rst price auction of
the …rst stage is given by:
¼ (v1; b (v1)) = Ej
£
u (v1 ¡ b (v1)) 1fb(v1)>b(vj )+z;j 6=1g
¤
+ (7)
Ej
h
u
¡
v1 ¡ v(2)¢ 1fv(2)<b(v1)<b(v(2))+zgi
considering that in the contingent Vickrey Stage bidding one’s value remains a
bidder’s best response even under risk aversion.
In the hybrid auction x0 bidders continue bidding x0: Once again the equi-
librium is a mixed strategy one. If FR (¢) is the cumulative distribution function
through which x1 bidders randomize in equilibrium, it must satisfy
u (x1; b) = u (x1 ¡ b) £(1 ¡ p)2+ 2 (1¡ p)pFR (b ¡ z) + p2FR (b¡ z)2¤ :
The same reasoning of the previous section allow us to determine the expected
payo¤ to a bidder observing the high value, U1, that is the same for all bids in the
support of the mixed strategy equilibrium. This also allows us to determine the
supports in which bidders randomize and the cumulative distribution function of
bids, FR; for b 2 £b; bR¤ :
U 1 = u (x1; b+ z) = u (x1 ¡ z) (1¡ p)2
FR (b ¡ z) =
µ
1¡ p
p
¶"
¡1 +
µ
1 ¡ u (x1 ¡ z)
u (x1 ¡ b)
¶0:5#
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The equilibrium bid strategies for the hybrid auction with symmetric risk averse
bidders are:
b (si1) =
8>><>:
¢ x0 if si1 = x0;
¢ bid randomly in the interval £x0; bR¤
according to the bid distribution function
FR (b) if si1 = x1;
where
bR = (x1 ¡ z) ¡ '¡u (x1 ¡ z) (1¡ p)2¢ ; ' (¢) = u (¢)¡1 :
The strict concavity of u implies thatFR stochastically dominates F:3 Considering
that when bidders are risk averse the …rst price auction implies higher expected
revenue to the seller than the oral ascending auction, we have the following
Proposition 2 When bidders are risk averse, the …rst price auction with a Vick-
rey auction as second stage when there are bids su¢ciently close to the top bid
implies higher expected revenue to the seller than standard auction mechanisms.
Proof. Again bidder’s expected utility is reduced by z:
4 Asymmetry
In the present section we retain the risk neutrality assumption, while dropping
the assumption that bidders’ values are identically distributed. We also assume
that the item has no intrinsic value that is common to all bidders. Di¤erent
from the other sections, we handle the two bidders case. Suppose now that two
bidders dispute an indivisible item in a hybrid auction. Two cases of asymmetry
are considered: in the …rst both buyers have the same probability of observing
the high value, although this high value is di¤erent for each bidder; in the second
buyers have di¤ering probabilities of observing the high value.
3This can be seen by comparing the expression valid to the risk
averse case, u (x1 ¡ b)
h
(1 ¡ p)2 + 2p (1 ¡ p)FR (b ¡ z) + p2FR (b ¡ z)2
i
=
u (x1 ¡ z) (1 ¡ p)2 ; to the expression valid to the risk neutral case,
(x1 ¡ b)
h
(1 ¡ p)2 + 2p (1 ¡ p)F (b ¡ z) + p2F (b ¡ z)2
i
= (x1 ¡ z) (1 ¡ p)2 :
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4.1 When Bidders Have Distinct High Values
Without loss of generality suppose that bidder 1, the “strong” bidder, can have
values ss1 = fx0; x2g ; x2 > x1; while the “weak” bidder continues to observe
either x0 or x1: The probabilities of observing the low and the high values are
common to both bidders; that is, pr [si1 = x0] = (1¡ p) ; i = s; w:
Once again we have a mixed strategy equilibrium that is completely charac-
terized by the cumulative distribution functions of bids of the strong and of the
weak bidders, Fs and Fw; respectively, and by the relevant supports. A bidder
with a low value bids as to have zero expected payo¤ in equilibrium. This implies
that b (x0) = x0: The expected payo¤ to the strong bidder (Us) who has a high
value of the commodity is given by:
Us (x2; b) = (x2 ¡ b) [(1 ¡ p) + pFw (b¡ z)] + p (x2 ¡x1) (1 ¡ Fw (b¡ z)) (8)
The second term in the right hand side of equation (8) is the payo¤ to the strong
bidder when a contingent Vickrey stage happens, that is, when buyers’ bids in
the …rst price auction are close enough. In turn, the expected pro…t to a weak
bidder who values the item at x1 and bids b is given by:
Uw (x1; b) = (x1 ¡ b) [(1¡ p) + pFs (b¡ z)] : (9)
In this context the optimal response from a weak bidder with a high value to a
strong bidder’s equilibrium strategy is to bid higher, implying that 0 = Fw (b) ;
where Fw stands for the weak buyer’s cumulative distribution function of bids.
This allows us to determine the expected payo¤ to a strong bidder with a high
value when she randomizes in the range
£
b; bs
¤
:
Us = Us (x2; b + z) = (x2 ¡ z) (1¡ p) + (x2 ¡ x1) p (10)
Substituting (10) into (8) ; we can determine the equilibrium bids distribution of
the weak bidder. Once in a mixed strategy equilibrium all bids in the support of
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the winning bids distribution must guarantee equal payo¤ to the bidder, including
the maximum bid bi; i = s; w.
Fw (b¡ z) =
µ
1 ¡ p
p
¶ µ
b ¡ z
x1 ¡ b
¶
bw =
µ
p
1¡ p
¶
(x1 ¡ z) (11)
Suppose the weak buyer is bidding according to her equilibrium mixed strategy.
If her maximum bid is bw; the strong buyer has no incentive to bid higher. If she
were to do so, she would do better lowering her bid by an in…nitesimal amount,
to bs ¡ ²: This would increase her expected payo¤, because her probability of
winning would not change, but her winning bid would be lower. This implies
that bw = bs ´ bA; that is, the maximum equilibrium bid is the same to the strong
and to the weak buyer : Analogously, one can show that the lower point in the
winning bids support, b, is common to both bidders. In fact, as there are no
gaps in the equilibrium bids distribution, b = b (x0) :By substituting (11) into
(9) one can determine the expected payo¤ to the weak bidder and then her bids
cumulative distribution function, that is the same as the one of the strong bidder.
Uw = Uw
¡
x1; bA+ z
¢
= (x1 ¡ z) (1¡ p)
In sum, when bidders have distinct high values, but the same probability of being
high the equilibrium bid strategies for the hybrid auction are
b (si1) =
8><>>:
¢ x0 if si1 = x0;
¢ bid randomly in the interval £x0; bA¤
according to the bid distribution
function Fw (b) if si1 = x1; x2:
Compared to the …rst price auction, the e¤ect of z is to increase the expected
revenue to the seller.
Proposition 3 In the two bidders asymmetric case, when bidders have distinct
high values to the item, but the same probability of being high, the …rst price
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auction with a Vickrey auction as second stage when there are bids that are suf-
…ciently close to the top bid implies higher expected revenue to the seller than
standard auction mechanisms.
Considering that a …rst price auction implies a greater revenue than the oral
ascending auction,4 under the present kind of asymmetry these auctions can be
ranked as ERHA > ERFPA > EROAA:
4.2 When Bidders Have Di¤erent Probabilities of Observ-
ing the High Value
Suppose now that both bidders have values in the same set, si1 = fx0; x1g ; but
di¤erent probabilities of observing the high value. The strong bidder (i = s) has
a value x1 with a higher probability, p; whilst the weak buyer (i = w) has a value
x1 with probability eq < p: In equilibrium a bidder with a value x0 bids her own
value, earning zero expected payo¤, which implies b (x0) = x0: In turn, a high
value bidder bids randomly in the interval
£
bi; bi
¤
; i = w; s:
The equilibrium characterization is completed through the cumulative distri-
bution functions, and the interval in which bidders randomize. The expected
payo¤ to the bidder s who bids b when si1 = x1 is given by:
Us (x1; b) = (x1 ¡ b) [(1¡ eq) + eqFw (b¡ z)] : (12)
In turn, the expected payo¤ to the weak bidder when sw = x1 is given by
Uw (x1; b) = (x1 ¡ b) [(1¡ p) + pFs (b¡ z)] : (13)
As there are no gaps in the equilibrium bids distribution, b; the minimum bid
by a x1 bidder, is equal to b (x0) : In a mixed strategy equilibrium the expected
payo¤s to the bidders are
Us (x1; b+ z) = (x1 ¡ b¡ z) [(1 ¡ eq) + eqFw (b)] (14)
4See Maskin and Riley [2]:
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and
Uw (x1; b+ z) = (x1 ¡ b¡ z) [(1¡ p) + pFs (b)] : (15)
By the same reasoning of the previous subsection, the maximum bid by a high
bidder, b; must be common to both bidders; that is, Fw
¡
b
¢
= 1 = Fs
¡
b
¢
: From
(12) and (13) in equilibrium both bidders have the same expected return, once
Us
¡
x1; b + z
¢
= Uw
¡
x1; b+ z
¢
: As p > eq from (14) and (15) we see that one
cannot have both Fw (b) and Fs (b) equal to zero. Instead we have Fs (b) ¸
Fw (b) = 0: The optimal response from a weak buyer when si1 = x1 is to bid
more aggressively. This allows us to determine Us = (x1 ¡ z) (1¡ eq) and the
cumulative distribution function of bids to the weak buyer with a high value.
Fw (b¡ z) =
µ
1¡ eqeq
¶µ
b¡ z
x1 ¡ b
¶
Substituting the expression Uw into equation (13) we determine the cumulative
distribution function of bids of a strong buyer with a high value.
FS (b¡ z) =
µ
1
p
¶·
(1¡ eq)µx1 ¡ z
x1 ¡ b
¶
¡ (1¡ p)
¸
In sum, when both bidders have the same high values but di¤erent probabilities
of being high, the equilibrium strategy in the hybrid auction is
b (si1) =
8><>>:
¢ x0 if si1 = x0;
¢ bid randomly in the interval £x0; bA^¤
according to the bid distribution function
Fi (b) if si1 = x1; i = s; w;
where bA^ = (1 ¡ eq) b+ eq (x1 ¡ z) . Once we have Us = (x1 ¡ z) (1 ¡ eq) = Uw;the
expected revenue to the seller in the hybrid auction is higher than in the …rst
price auction.
ERHA = [1¡ (1¡ p) (1¡ eq)]x1 ¡ (p + eq) (x1 ¡ z) (1 ¡ eq)
In the present setting the equilibrium strategy in the oral ascending auction is to
bid one’s value. So the seller’s expected revenue is equal to peqx1: The di¤erence
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between these auction mechanisms in terms of expected revenue is given by
e¢ = ERHA ¡EROAA = ¡eq (p¡ eq) + (p + eq) (1¡ eq) z:
If z is large enough, that is, if e¢ > 0; these auction mechanisms are ranked as
ERHA > EROAA > ERFPA in terms of expected revenue :
5 Mixed Values
In the section 2 we examined the independent private value case and showed
that the hybrid auction generates more revenue than any standard auction. We
show that this is also true outside the independent private values paradigm.5 Now
each bidder can observe one of four possible combinations of signals: s0 = (x0; L) ;
s1 = (x0; H) = (x1; L) ; s2 = (x1; H) : For simplicity, we assume that bidders who
observe the intermediate signals have a similar pattern of bidding.
We look for an equilibrium in mixed strategies such that a bidder 1 who
receives signals s0 = (x0; L) wins the auction only when bidders 2 and 3 observe
the same signals. The expected payo¤ of one such bidder if she bids b is given by
U ((x0; L) ; b) = [x0 + ¼0 ¡ b] p2¼(L;LjL)
where
¼(x;yjw) = Pr fs22 = x; s32 = yjs12 = wg
¼t; t = 0; 1; 2; 3; is the expected value of the common factor given that t buyers
observe a H signal.
Once again to determine her bid we can use the fact that in equilibrium the
lower type bidder earns zero expected return.
b = b (x0; L) = x0 + ¼0
5Bidders are assumed to be symmetric and risk neutral.
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The other bidders’ types, those who observe signals s1 and s2; bid probabilis-
tically. The monotonicity and continuity properties6 allow us to determine the
equilibrium returns of those buyers.7 The monotonicity property implies that the
set of possible bids in mixed strategy to a bidder who observes signal st+1 must
be at least as great as the set of possible bids when she observes signal st: Let
b1 be the largest possible bid to a s1-type buyer. By continuity there can be no
gaps in the winning bids distribution so b1 is also the lowest possible bid of an
agent who observes signal s2:
The equilibrium of one such auction consists of supports
£
b; b1
¤
and
£
b1; b2
¤
to bidders observing s1 and s2, respectively, and the associated distribution func-
tions. Let the winning bids distribution function of the s1-type bidders be G1
with support
£
b; b1
¤
. The expected return to a bidder who observes signal s1 and
bids b is given by:
U1 ((x1; L) ; b) = (x1+ ¼0 ¡ b) p2¼(L;LjL ) + £2 (x1 + ¼1 ¡ b) p2¼(L;HjL)+ (16)
2 (x1 + ¼0 ¡ b) pq¼(L;LjL)
¤
G1 (b¡ z) +
£
(x1 + ¼2 ¡ b) p2¼(H;HjL)+
2 (x1 + ¼1 ¡ b) pq¼(L;HjL) + (x1 + ¼0 ¡ b) q2¼(L;LjL)
¤
G21 (b¡ z) :
Using the fact that G1 (b) = 0; one may de…ne the expected payo¤ of a s0-type
bidder:
U1 = U1 (b+ z) = (x1+ ¼0 ¡ b ¡ z) p2¼(L;LjL) (17)
Equating (16) and (17), considering that G1
¡
b1
¢
= 1; it is possible to …nd b1:
b1 =
¡
bp2¼(L;LjL) + (x1 + ¼0 ¡ z) ¡1 ¡ p2¢ ¼(L;LjL ) +
2 (x1+ ¼1 ¡ z) p¼(L;HjL) + (x1 + ¼2 ¡ z) p2¼(H;HjL)
¢
=¡
¼(L;LjL ) + 2p¼(L;HjL ) + p2¼(H;HjL)
¢
6By continuity we mean that there can be neither mass points (points of strictly positive
probability) nor gaps in the distribution of the equilibrium bids.
7We begin by assuming that these two properties hold and then verify that they are in fact
satis…ed in equilibrium.
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The winning bids distribution function for a buyer observing s1, G1 (:) ; can then
be completely determined through equations (16) and (17) : Its expressions is
provided in the appendix. In turn, a s2-type buyer bids in the range
£
b1; b2
¤
: As
all the strategies played with positive probability in a mixed strategy equilibrium
must guarantee her equal expected payo¤ , it is possible to determine the expected
return of one such buyer using the fact that when bidding b1 a bidder observing s2
only wins with positive probability when all her opponents observe lower signals.
If she bids b; her expected return is
U2 ((x1; H ) ; b) = (x1 + ¼1 ¡ b) p2¼(L;LjH ) + [2 (x1 + ¼2 ¡ b)p2¼(L;HjH )+ (18)
2 (x1 + ¼1 ¡ b)pq¼(L;LjH )]G1 (b ¡ z) + [(x1 + ¼3 ¡ b) p2¼(H;HjH )+
2(x1 + ¼2 ¡ b) pq¼(L;HjH ) + (x1 + ¼1 ¡ b)q2¼(L;LjH )]G21 (b¡ z) +
f(1 ¡G1 (b¡ z)) £¡x1 + ¼1 ¡ ¯ ¡s1¢¢ ¡1 ¡ p2¢ ¼(L;LjH ) +¡
x1 + ¼2 ¡ ¯ ¡s1¢¢ 2p¼(L;HjH ) + ¡x1 + ¼3 ¡ ¯ ¡s1¢¢ p2¼(H;HjH )¤g:
The expected payo¤ to a s2-type buyer that bids b allows us to rewrite (18) as
U2 (b) = U1 +K +ÃG1 (b ¡ z) + µG21 (b¡ z) ; Ã < 0;
where
Ã = 2(¼3 ¡ ¼2) p¼(L;HjH ) ¡ (¼1 ¡ ¼0) ¡1¡ p2¢ ¼(L;LjL) ¡ (x1 ¡ x0) p2¼(H;HjH)
and
µ = (x1 ¡ x0) ¡q2¼(L;LjL) +2pq¼(L;HjH ) + p2¼(H;HjH)¢ :
Ordinarily the monotonicity property would imply that the expected payo¤ func-
tion to a bidder observing signal st+1 would increase monotonically in the support
of the winning bids distribution function of an agent observing signal st: This
would imply that the lowest possible bid for an st+1 buyer would be the largest
possible bid for an st agent. In turn, in the present setup a s2-type bidder that
bids in the range
£
b1; Es1
¤
competing with at least one s1 bidder and no s2 buyer
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has a chance to go to a second stage once her opponents bid close enough. If
this happens, in the Vickrey auction she raises her bid to ¯ (s2) = Es2 whilst her
opponents raise their bids to their conditional expected value for the item, that
is ¯ (st) = Est. As a result, the s2 bidder wins the auction earning a payo¤ of
(x1 + ¼1 ¡ ¯ (s1)) : This set of events is expressed enclosed in braces in equation
(18) : In summary, the expected return function to a bidder observing s2 does
not increase monotonically in the range
£
b; b1
¤
when three is the number of pos-
sible types: In this range the expected payo¤ function is a convex function once
condition
¡
ÃG1 (b¡ z) + µG21 (b¡ z)
¢ ¡
b1 ¡ b¢ · (b¡ b) (Ã + µ) (19)
is satis…ed.8 Considering the expected return of a s2-type bidder in both limits
of these support, it is possible to exclude b as an equilibrium. If this were the
bid to one such buyer, a s1 bidder could beat a s2 bidder in the …rst stage of the
mechanism through a bid b (s1) = b + z: So,
b (si) =
½
b if si = s0; s2
b+ z if si = s1
cannot be an equilibrium, as it would imply an expected return of
U2 (b; (x1; H)) = (x1 + ¼1 ¡ b) p2¼(L;LjH )
to a bidder observing (x1; H) : Note that this expected return is strictly lower than
the one earned by the buyer in the proposed equilibrium. We can then conclude
that if condition (19) is satis…ed, a bidder observing s2 strictly prefers bidding b1
than any lower value. So the monotonicity property holds in equilibrium.9 The
8The convexity condition stems from U2(b)¡U2(b)b¡b ·
U2(b1)¡U2(b)
b1¡b .
9 It is not hard to verify that the continuity property also holds in equilibrium.
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expected return to a s2-type bidder is then
U2 =
¡
x1 + ¼1 ¡ b1 ¡ z
¢
p2¼(L;LjH ) + 2
¡
x1+ ¼2 ¡ b1 ¡ z
¢
p2¼(L;HjH )+ (20)
+2
¡
x1 + ¼1 ¡ b1 ¡ z¢ pq¼(L;LjH ) + ¡x1 + ¼3 ¡ b1 ¡ z¢ p2¼(H;HjH )+
+2
¡
x1 + ¼2 ¡ b1 ¡ z¢ pq¼(L;HjH ) + ¡x1 + ¼1 ¡ b1 ¡ z¢ q2¼(L;LjH ):
The equilibrium bid strategies for the hybrid auction with symmetric risk neutral
buyers who have mixed values for a single indivisible object are:
b (si1; si2) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
¢ b if si = s0;
¢ bid randomly in the interval £b; b1¤
according to the bid distribution function
G1 (b) if si = s1;
¢ bid randomly in the interval £b1; b2¤
according to the bid distribution function
G2 (b) if si = s2;
where
b2 =
£¡
¼(L;LjH) + 2p¼(L;HjH) + p2¼(H;HjH)
¢
b1 + 2(x1 + ¼2 ¡ z) (1 ¡ p)¼(L;HjH)+
(x1 + ¼3 ¡ z) ¡1¡ p2¢ ¼(H;HjH)¤ ±¡¼(L;LjH) + 2p¼(L;HjH ) + p2¼(H;HjH)¢ :
Assuming that the convexity condition is satis…ed,10 we have
Proposition 4 The …rst price auction with a Vickrey auction as a second stage
when there are bids su¢ciently close to the top bid guarantees a higher expected
revenue to the seller as compared to standard auction mechanisms.
Proof: z decreases the expected return of the bidders that observe signals s1
and s2; as can be seen by expressions (17) and (20) but the expected social value
does not change with z.
10The winning bids distribution for a buyer observing s2; G2 (:) ; is provided in the Appendix
A.
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6 Continuous Types
A natural concern is the choice of a discrete types model. In this section we show
that with continuous types thy hybrid auction does not in general admit pure
strategy equilibrium. In what follows we assume two players but in appendix B
we generalize the argument to n ¸ 2 bidders.
For simplicy, assume that bidder’s values are uniformly distributed on the
interval [0; 1] : We seek a monotone symmetric equilibrium.
Suppose bidder i bids the amount b, and her rival bids according to a monotone
increasing equilibrium strategy b (y) : Then bidder i wins if her bid is higher than
her rival’s bid by more than z; obtaining a payo¤ (v ¡ b) :Otherwise both bidders
dispute the object in a Vickrey auction, where bidding one’s value is a dominant
strategy. If she wins, her payo¤ is (v ¡ y) : But if y < b < b (y) + z; bidder i’s
payo¤ is (v ¡ b) :Thus bidder i0s problem is to …nd a bidding functions b (v) that
maximizes her expected payo¤ – that is expressed in equation (21) :
¼ (v; b; b (y)) = E
£
(v¡ b) 1fb>b(y)+zg + (v ¡Max fb; yg)+ 1fb<b(y)+zg¤ (21)
Thereby ¸ (b) is the inverse of b (v) ; which indicates the valuation that leads to
bidding b when strategy b¤ (v) is to be played.
= E
£
(v ¡ b)1fy< (¸b¡z)g + (v¡Max fb;yg)+ 1fy>¸(b¡z)g¤
= (v¡ b)F (¸ (b ¡ z)) + E £(v¡Max fb; yg)+ 1fy>¸(b¡z)g¤
= (v ¡ b)F (¸ (b¡ z)) + (v ¡ b)
bZ
(¸b¡z)
f (y) dy +
+
1Z
Maxfb;¸(b¡z)g
(v¡ y)+ f (y) dy
In general there are two cases:
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Case 1: b < ¸ (b¡ z)
y > ¸ (b¡ z) ) y > b
¼ (v; b; b (y)) = (v¡ b)F (¸ (b ¡ z)) +
1Z
¸(b¡z)
(v ¡ y)+ f (y)dy
Case 2: b ¸ ¸ (b ¡ z)
¼ (v; b; b (y)) = (v¡ b)F (b) +
1Z
b
(v ¡ y)+ f (y)dy
In both cases
¼ (v; b; b (y)) = (v ¡ b)F (Max f¸ (b¡ z) ; bg) +
1Z
Maxfb; (¸b¡z)g
(v ¡ y)+ f (y)dy:
Let g (b) = Maxf¸ (b¡ z) ; bg :Then
@¼
@b
= ¡F (g (b)) + (v ¡ b) f (g (b)) g0 (b) ¡ (v ¡ g (b))+ f (g (b))g 0 (b)
The …rst order condition is
(g (b) ¡ b) g0 (b) = F (g (b))
f (g (b))
:
For vi » U [0; 1] ; the …rst order di¤erential equation reduces to:
(g (b)¡ b) g0 (b) = g (b) : (22)
Solving the di¤erential equation (22) one obtains
g (b) = b+
p
b2 + c2: (23)
The initial condition
¸ (0) = z (24)
means that the type z bidder is the one who bids z. Substituting (24) in (23) one
can determine the constant c and then obtain the candidate equilibrium bidding
function b¤ (v).
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We claim that
b¤ (v) =
8<:
¡
(v ¡ z)+¢2
2v
if v > z
0 otherwise
is not a pure bidding strategy equilibrium in the …rst stage.
Proof: It su¢ces to show that by deviating from b¤ a player 1 bidder with
a private value v1 < z can earn a positive payo¤: Suppose that bidder 1 followseb (v) = v=2: There is a positive probability that the other player has a private
value smaller than z also. Assume that v2 < v1 < z: If bidder 2 follows eb; bidder
1 may earn a positive payo¤ equal to (v2 ¡ v1) > 0 at the end of the second stage
- that in this case is mandatory once
v2 ¡ v1
2
< v2 ¡ v1 < z:If bidder 20s value is
larger than z; bidder 1will loose nothing either if she looses in the …rst price sealed
bid auction, b¤ (v2) > eb (v1) + z; or if she disputes the object in the contingent
second stage, that is, if b¤ (v2) < eb (v1) + z: So eb (:) can be a best response to a
bidder with a private value lower than z and b¤ (:) is not an equilibrium.
7 Conclusion
We have demonstrated that the hybrid auction generates more revenue than any
standard auction and that it is ex-post e¢cient. Additional research is needed
to study the properties of such mechanisms in terms of the traditional concerns
of competition policy such as preventing collusive, predatory and entry deterring
behavior. For example, the sealed bid stage may help to deter tacit collusion, a
common phenomenon in ascending auctions (see, for example, Menezes [4]). On
the other hand, the Vickrey auction stage may work towards increasing revenue.
In the Brazilian Telecom auctions, the average number of bidders was equal to
four bidders. Of the twelve auctions, only two were followed by a second stage.
Additionally, in both cases when there was a second stage, the winner of the
second stage was the bidder who submitted the second highest bid in the …rst
price auction!
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8 Appendix
A Mixed Values
In the mixed values equilibrium the s1-type buyers bid randomly in the interval£
b; b1
¤
according to the winning bids distribution function G1 (b¡ z) :
G1 (b ¡ z) = ¡2 ¡ (x1 + ¼2 ¡ b) p2¼(H;HjL) + 2 (x1+ ¼1 ¡ b) pq¼(L;HjL)+
(x1 + ¼0 ¡ b) q2¼(L;LjL) ¢¢¡1 © ¡2 (x1 + ¼1 ¡ b) p2¼(L;HjL)+
¡2 (x1 + ¼0 ¡ b)pq¼(L;LjL) + £ ¡2 (x1 + ¼1 ¡ b)p2¼(L;HjL )+
2(x1 + ¼0 ¡ b)pq¼(L;LjL)
¢2 ¡ 4¡(x1 + ¼2 ¡ b)p2¼(H;HjL )+
+2(x1 + ¼1 ¡ b) pq¼(L;HjL ) + (x1 + ¼0 ¡ b) q2¼(L;LjL) (b+ z ¡ b) p2¼(L;LjL )
¤1
2
o
In turn, the s2-type buyers bid randomly in the range
£
b1; b2
¤
according to the
G2 (b¡ z) distribution function.
B Inexistence of pure strategy equilibrium with
n¸ 2 bidders and continuous types
Let y = Max
i 6=j fvjg : Then the expected payo¤ to the bidder who values the item
to be auctioned at v and bids b when the maximum bid from her opponents is
b (y) is
¼ (v; b; b (y)) = E
£
(v¡ b) 1fb>b(y)+zg + (v ¡Maxfb; yg)+ 1fb<b(y)+zg¤
= (v ¡ b)F (Maxf¸ (b¡ z) ; bg)n¡1 +
1Z
Maxfb;¸(b¡z)g
(v¡ y)+F (y)n¡2 f (y) dy:
Let g (b) = Maxf¸ (b¡ z) ; bg :Then
¼ (v; b; b (y)) = (v¡ b)F (g (b))n¡1+
1Z
g(b)
(v ¡ y)+F (y)n¡2 f (y) dy¶:
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The …rst order condition is then
(n¡ 1) (g (b)¡ b) g0 (b) = F (g (b))
f (g (b))
:
For v » U [0; 1] ;
(n¡ 1) (g (b) ¡ b)g0 (b) = g (b) :
To solve the di¤erential equation we multiply both sides of it by g(b)n¡2 and
integrate. We get for some positive c:
g(b)n ¡ n
(n¡ 1)g (b)
n¡1 b = c:
Using initial condition g(z) = z;
(n¡ 1)g (b)n ¡ ng (b)n¡1 b+ zn = 0:
With the assumption that ¸(:) is an increasing function, it is easy to see that
g(b) = ¸(b¡ z) ¸ b: Thus we get the following equation for b(v):
(n¡ 1)vn ¡ nvn¡1b(v) + z) + zn = 0
and therefore
b(v) =
(n¡ 1)vn ¡nvn¡1z + zn
nvn¡1
:
This matches the expression we obtained before for n = 2. It remains to show
that
b¤ (v) =
½
(n¡1)vn¡nvn¡1z+zn
nvn¡1 ; if v > z
0 if v < z
is not a pure strategy equilibrium. This follows from the fact that the bid func-
tion cannot contain ‡at portions in some interval [v1; v2] in the support [0; 1].
Otherwise a bidder with some valuation in the ‡at interval could raise her ex-
pected payo¤ by marginally raising her bid once she could always win when the
second highest valuation were in the same interval. The same reasoning of the
two-bidders case applies.
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